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Abstract
The EOSIO blockchain, one of the representative Delegated
Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) blockchain platforms, has grown
rapidly recently. Meanwhile, a number of vulnerabilities and
high-profile attacks against top EOSIO DApps and their smart
contracts have also been discovered and observed in the wild,
resulting in serious financial damages. Most of the EOSIO
smart contracts are not open-sourced and they are typically
compiled to WebAssembly (Wasm) bytecode, thus making
it challenging to analyze and detect the presence of possi-
ble vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose EOSAFE, the
first static analysis framework that can be used to automati-
cally detect vulnerabilities in EOSIO smart contracts at the
bytecode level. Our framework includes a practical symbolic
execution engine for Wasm, a customized library emulator for
EOSIO smart contracts, and four heuristics-driven detectors
to identify the presence of four most popular vulnerabilities
in EOSIO smart contracts. Experimental results suggest that
EOSAFE achieves promising results in detecting vulnerabili-
ties, with an F1-measure of 98%. We have applied EOSAFE
to all active 53,666 smart contracts in the ecosystem (as of
November 15, 2019). Our results show that over 25% of the
smart contracts are vulnerable. We further analyze possible
exploitation attempts on these vulnerable smart contracts and
identify 48 in-the-wild attacks (25 of them have been con-
firmed by DApp developers), which have resulted in financial
loss of at least 1.7 million USD.
1 Introduction
With the growing prosperity of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bit-
coin), blockchain techniques have become more attractive and
been adopted in a number of areas. Due to the limited through-
put (e.g., Transaction Per Second, aka TPS) derived from the
inherent principle of the Proof-of-Work consensus, traditional
blockchain platforms (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) cannot be
used to support high performance applications. Researchers
have proposed different consensus protocols, e.g., Proof-of-
Stack (PoS) [1] and Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) [2], to
resolve the performance issues.
As one of the most representative DPoS platforms and
the first decentralized operating system, EOSIO has become
one of the most active global communities. EOSIO adopts
a multi-threaded mechanism based on its DPoS consensus
protocol, which is capable of achieving millions of TPS. The
performance advantage of EOSIO makes it popular for De-
centralized Applications (DApps) developers. EOSIO has
successfully surpassed Ethereum in DApp transactions just
three months after its launch in June 2018 [3] and has fur-
ther increased its dominance by dozens of times after another
several months [4]. For example, the transaction volume of
EOSIO on average is more than a hundred times greater than
Ethereum [5]. As of 2019, the total value of on-chain transac-
tions of EOSIO has reached more than 6 billion USD.
A smart contract is a computer protocol that allows users
to digitally negotiate an agreement in a convenient and secure
way. In contrast to the traditional contract law, the transac-
tion costs of the smart contract are dramatically reduced, and
the correctness of its execution is ensured by the consen-
sus protocol. EOSIO smart contracts can be written in C++,
which will be compiled to WebAssembly (aka Wasm) and
executed in the EOS Virtual Machine (EOS VM). Wasm is
a web standard specifying the binary instruction format for
a stack-based VM. It can run in modern web browsers and
other environments [6].
However, it is not easy to guarantee the security of the
implementation of smart contracts, EOSIO in particular. A
number of vulnerabilities have been discovered in EOSIO
smart contracts, while severe attacks have been observed in
the wild, which caused great financial damages. For instance,
in fall 2018, a gambling DApp, EOSBet, was attacked twice
within just a month [7, 8] due to fake EOS and fake receipt
vulnerabilities, causing 40,000 and 65,000 EOS losses, re-
spectively. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the security
issues of smart contracts in order to prevent such attacks.
Unfortunately, most smart contracts on EOSIO are not
open-sourced, and there are few analysis tools towards an-
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alyzing the Wasm bytecode, which makes it more difficult
to detect vulnerabilities for EOSIO smart contracts automati-
cally. Although many efforts have been made to analyze the
Ethereum smart contracts [9–16], none of them, however, can
be applied to EOSIO smart contracts, as these two ecosys-
tems are totally different, ranging from the virtual machine,
the structure of bytecode, to the types of vulnerabilities.
Specifically, there exists several challenges to analyze EO-
SIO smart contracts. First of all, EOS VM is more compli-
cated than Ethereum VM in regard to their instructions, in-
cluding both quantity and variety. For example, EOS VM
supports floating point operations, type conversion and ad-
vanced jump instructions like br_table. Secondly, compared
with Ethereum bytecode, the Wasm bytecode itself is more
complicated to analyze due to the multi-level nested structure
in functions, which leads to a complicated jump relationship
between basic blocks. Thirdly, most EOSIO vulnerabilities
discovered so far are more complicated than previously dis-
covered simple vulnerabilities (e.g., integer overflow). Thus
it usually requires more semantic information, e.g., fields of
the platform-specific data structure as the indexes, to model
and analyze them. For example, to detect the fake EOS vul-
nerability (described in Section 3.1), we need to check the
specific value of argument code in function apply.
This Paper. We have implemented EOSAFE, the first sys-
tematic static analysis framework for detecting vulnerabilities
of EOSIO smart contracts. Specifically, we first implement
a symbolic execution engine for the Wasm bytecode, and
mitigate the inherent path explosion problem by applying
a heuristic-guided pruning approach. Second, to analyze an
EOSIO smart contract and simulate its external interactive
environment, we implement an emulator to mimic the be-
haviors of key EOSIO library functions that are crucial in
vulnerability detection. Third, we propose a generic vulnera-
bility detection framework, which allows security analysts to
easily implement their own vulnerability detectors as plugins.
In this work, we have implemented four detectors aiming to
detect four high-profile vulnerabilities, including fake EOS,
fake receipt, rollback and missing permission check (see §3).
To evaluate the effectiveness of EOSAFE, we first manually
crafted a benchmark suite including 52 smart contracts, which
is composed of vulnerable smart contracts collected from pub-
licly verified attacks and their corresponding patched ones.
Experiment results suggest that EOSAFE achieves excellent
performance in identifying existing vulnerabilities. To mea-
sure the presence of vulnerabilities in the EOSIO ecosystem,
we further applied EOSAFE to all the smart contracts in the
ecosystem (53,666 in total). Experiment results suggest that
security vulnerabilities are prevalent in the EOSIO ecosys-
tem: over 25% of the smart contracts (including historical
versions) are vulnerable, and a large portion of them have not
been patched timely. To further measure the impact of the
vulnerabilities, we collect the transaction records (over 2.5
billion transactions in total), and carefully design a set of con-
servative heuristic strategies to identify attacks targeting these
vulnerable smart contracts. We have identified 48 attacks in
total, as well as 183 missing permission check actions. By the
time of this writing, 25 attacks have been confirmed by DApp
developers, which have already caused the financial loss of
over 1.7 million USD.
We make the following main research contributions:
• We propose EOSAFE, the first systematic static analysis
framework for EOSIO smart contracts, which is capa-
ble of detecting four kinds of popular vulnerabilities.
Experiment results demonstrate that EOSAFE achieves
excellent performance.
• We propose the valuable-function-centric detection
framework, which is based on our observed vulnerability-
specific pruning strategies, to effectively mitigate the
path explosion issue.
• We apply EOSAFE to analyze over 53K EOSIO smart
contracts, and perform the first measurement study of the
ecosystem. We reveal the severity of the security issues,
i.e., over 25% of the smart contracts have been exposed
to the threats introduced by these vulnerabilities.
• We have identified 48 attacks and 183 missing permis-
sion check actions related to the identified vulnerabili-
ties, which have caused huge financial loss. Most of the
severe attacks have been confirmed by DApp Teams.
2 Background
As the first industrial-scale decentralized operating sys-
tem [17], the EOSIO platform can achieve high perfor-
mance, i.e., millions of TPS, to efficiently execute compli-
cated DApps. The fact that it performs so efficiently is due in
large part to the consensus algorithm it uses, i.e., DPoS. Com-
pared to traditional PoW (adopted by Bitcoin and Ethereum),
it does not spend vast amount of computing resources on the
unnecessary mining process. We next introduce some key
concepts to facilitate the understanding of this work.
2.1 Account Management
An account in EOSIO is the basic unit to identify an entity.
It can trigger transactions to other accounts in EOSIO. Addi-
tionally, to ensure account security and prevent identity fraud,
EOSIO implements an advanced permission-based access
control system. Specifically, the account can assign public/pri-
vate keys to specific actions, and a particular key pair will
only be able to execute the corresponding action. By default,
an EOSIO account is attached to two public keys: the owner
key (which specifies the ownership of the account) and the
active key (which grants access to activities with the account).
These two keys authorize two native named permissions: the
owner and active permission, to manage accounts. Apart from
the native permissions, EOSIO also allows customized named
permissions for advanced account management.
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Transaction #1
Action #1
(Smart contract 
A)
Action #n
(Smart contract 
B)
...
Inline Action #n.1
(Smart contract C)
Deferred Action #n.2
(Smart contract D)
Trigger
Transaction #m
Action #n.2
(Smart contract 
D)
Figure 1: The model of transaction and action in EOSIO.
Unlike Ethereum, an EOSIO smart contract is not treated
as a separate entity. A smart contract is just a snippet of code
stored in an account, which makes it easy to explain why a
smart contract in EOSIO is updatable, rather than something
that cannot be changed and destructed freely by the owner.
Therefore, when an account is invoked by another one, the
smart contract in which it resides will be responsible for han-
dling the received invocation. In this way, the most critical
component in contract is the dispatcher, which can dispatch
the requests to the corresponding functions. Defined by EO-
SIO official, the dispatcher in a smart contract is named as
apply that is shown in Listing 1. The details of implementa-
tion and parameter implications are discussed in §2.2.
1 void apply(uint64_t receiver , uint64_t code ,
uint64_t action) {
2 if(action == N(onerror)) {
3 check(code == N(eosio), "exception captured");
4 }
5 auto self = receiver;
6 if((code == self || code == N(eosio.token))) {
7 switch(action) {
8 EOSIO_DISPATCH_HELPER(TYPE , MEMBERS)
9 }
10 }
11 }
Listing 1: An example of dispatcher apply.
2.2 EOSIO Transactions
A transaction is the basic unit to be verified by nodes, which
is packaged in blocks. As shown in Fig. 1, a transaction is
composed of one or multiple actions. An action is the basic
unit to trigger functions. For example, the action at line 1
in Listing 1 specifies the target function name. An action is
responsible for carrying permissions of the invoker.
An action can trigger other actions under the same context
in two ways: inlined and deferred. Specifically, the inlined
action can be regarded as an ordinary action, which inherits
the context of its parent, including the carried permissions.
As for the deferred action, the reason it was introduced is that
the execution time is capped at 30 ms per transaction [18],
and all non-essential actions can be split into deferred actions
for execution. Consequently, the deferred action is executed
in a different transaction as shown in Fig. 1.
Besides transaction and action, there exists another exclu-
sive mechanism, namely notification. As shown in Fig. 2,
EOS is the official token issued by the account eosio.token. It
maintains a table to record the holders and their balance. Thus,
to transfer EOS to a DApp, a user has to request the transfer
function in eosio.token. For step 1 in Fig. 2, the code, which

v
w
eosio.token
User DApp
Invoke transfer in eosio.token
vNotify payer if the payment succeeds
wNotify payee if the payment succeeds
Code: eosio.token
Action: transfer
Receiver: DApp
Code: eosio.token
Action: transfer
Receiver: eosio.token
Figure 2: Transferring EOS from the user to a DApp.
indicates whose code is actually invoked, is eosio.token; the
receiver, which represents the receiver of the action or noti-
fication, is also eosio.token. After updating the balance table,
eosio.token will notify both of payer and payee (see step 2
and 3). Note that the code in step 3 is still eosio.token as noti-
fication is not an action at all, and the receiver is the DApp.
Finally, the notification will also be handled by a dispatcher,
just like the action invocation with the same name. Therefore,
we can understand the meaning of parameters used in the
dispatcher at line 1 in Listing 1.
2.3 Wasm Bytecode and EOS VM
The EOSIO smart contracts are written in C++ and then com-
piled into WebAssembly (Wasm) bytecode, which will be
executed in the EOS VM. Wasm is a binary instruction for-
mat for a stack-based virtual machine. Although it is designed
to be an open standard to enable high-performance web ap-
plications, it can also be used to support other environments
like blockchain. Due to its efficiency and portability, besides
EOSIO, other popular blockchains (e.g., Ethereum 2.0 [19])
are going to support Wasm.
An EOSIO Wasm binary is called a module. Inside a mod-
ule, numerous sections exist. To be specific, in Function sec-
tion, the order of functions is determined, which corresponds
to the order of implementation of functions (in low-level in-
structions) in Code section. All the indexes of functions that
appear in Element section can be treated as entries to current
module. Additionally, string literals are often used to initialize
the Memory section and stored in the Data section.
Like Ethereum VM, EOS VM supports Stack, Local, and
Global, which are pushed and popped from a virtual stack by
several instructions (such as local_set, global_get). Also,
EOS VM has an area called Memory, a random-accessible
linear array of bytes, which can only be accessed by using
specific instructions, e.g., load and store.
3 Vulnerabilities in EOSIO Smart Contracts
Attacks can be performed in anytime during the life-cycle
of contract execution. Thus, we first present the general life-
cycle of smart contract execution using a gambling DApp
as an example, as depicted in Fig. 3. Firstly, the player in-
vokes transfer in eosio.token to take part in the game. Then,
when the DApp receives the notification, it would dispatch
the request to transfer through the dispatcher. After that,
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transfer would call reveal to calculate a random number
to determine if the player hits the jackpot this round. If it is,
the DApp will trigger transfer in eosio.token to return the
prize to the player. However, attackers can exploit the vul-
nerabilities in each step to gain profit. For example, in steps
3 and 4, failing to rigorously verify the values of the input
parameters could be exploited by attackers. On top of that,
this whole betting and revealing process has the potential to
be maliciously rolled back. In this section, we discuss four
kinds of popular vulnerabilities, relating to the life-cycle of
contract execution.
Gambling DApp
Player
eosio.token
apply
transfer
reveal
Invoke transfer to take part in game
Notify player (payer)
Notify DApp (payee)
Dispatch to transfer function
Invoke reveal to calculate jackpot
Invoke transfer to return prize
Notify DApp (payer)
Notify player (payee)
Figure 3: The general life-cycle of smart contract execution.
3.1 Fake EOS
Anyone can create and issue a token called EOS, as the token
names and symbols are not required to be unique in EOSIO.
Moreover, recall the notification mechanism introduced in
§2.2, the code in the notification is slightly different from in
the action. Therefore, the incorrect verification for code at
step 3 in Fig. 3 may lead to vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Description. As the source code of eo-
sio.token is entirely public, anyone can make a copy of its
source code and issue a token, with the identical name, sym-
bol and code. The only difference between the fake EOS and
the official one is that they have different issuers. Therefore,
if an attacker transfers the fake EOS to a gambling DApp
via the transfer function of the copied contract, the code
of the notification received by the project side will not be
eosio.token. Additionally, if the DApp happens not to check
the value of the code, then the verification in dispatcher will
be bypassed. To mitigate the above issue, some developers
narrow down the scope of accepted code, as shown in line 6
of Listing 1. “code == self” is used to handle the direct call
from other accounts, while “code == N(eosio.token)” only
accepts the notification from the official account. However,
due to short-circuit evaluation [20], if an attacker directly
calls transfer in DApp, the verification will also be invalid
because there is even no change of balance for both entities.
As these two cases are only related to fake EOS tokens, in
this work, we name both of them as fake EOS vulnerabilities.
3.2 Fake Receipt
If the DApp developer performs a comprehensive check
against the code, the notification will then be forwarded by
the dispatcher to transfer, as shown in step 4 in Fig. 3. How-
ever, if the developer does not perform a verification in this
step, the DApp can be attacked.
Vulnerability Description. It is necessary to emphasize
that the notification can be forwarded, and the code will not
change. Therefore, DApp might be deceived by the attacker
that plays the dual roles (accounts) of an initiator and an ac-
complice at the same time. To be specific, the initiator invokes
a regular transfer to accomplice (indicated by to, the argu-
ment of the transfer function) through eosio.token. When
accomplice is notified by eosio.token, it will immediately for-
ward the notification to DApp without modification. In this
way, the code is not changed, which is the official issuer: eo-
sio.token. Therefore, the dispatcher will be unaware of any
anomalies. However, if the parameter to is not checked in
transfer, the DApp will be fooled as the token transferring
is completed between two accounts that are controlled by the
attacker. It results in direct financial loss for DApp developers.
As the notification is triggered by require_recipient,
we name this vulnerability fake receipt .
3.3 Rollback
In Fig. 3, transfer and reveal are the key functions. In
transfer, DApp handles the bet that is received along with
the player’s transfer; in reveal, the developer often uses
various on-chain state values as seeds (e.g., current_time,
which indicates the timestamp when the action is executed)
to generate a pseudo-random number1 and finally obtains the
result by comparing the generated number with the player’s
input. Note that, in general, the rollback cases can only be
found in gambling DApps. We assume the reveal function
is always there and is reachable from the entry point (i.e., the
apply function) for every gambling DApp.
Vulnerability Description. Even if the developer does a
thorough check on every parameter inputted and checks the
caller’s permissions before any sensitive actions, a game that
matches the model in Fig. 3 may still be attacked. To be spe-
cific, all the actions are invoked inline, i.e., locating in a single
transaction. Therefore, when the player receives the notifica-
tion after step 8, he could immediately invoke another inlined
action to eosio.token to check his balance. If his balance is
reduced, then it means he did not win this round. He can use
an assertion statement to force the current action to fail. We
have mentioned in §2.2 that the failure of an action could lead
to revert of the whole transaction. In this way, the player can
keep trying until he hits the jackpot. We refer to this malicious
rollback as the rollback vulnerability.
3.4 Missing Permission Check
Before performing any sensitive operation, the developer
should check whether the corresponding permission is carried
by the action. For example, before step 5 in Fig. 3, the DApp
should check whether the caller could represent the actual
payer to participate in the game.
1The “pseudo” is due to all these seeds value are deterministic for lack of
a true randomness source on blockchain temporarily.
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Vulnerability Description. Permission checking is en-
forced by require_auth(acct) in EOSIO, which is used to
check whether the caller has been authorized by acct to trig-
ger the corresponding function. Note that the inlined actions
inherit the context of their parents, including the permissions
(see §2.1). Therefore, if an attacker carrying insufficient per-
mission invokes a function, in which it performs sensitive
operations via inlined actions and without permission check-
ing, the unexpected behaviors would happen. We regard all
the functions lacking of permission checking as the ones with
the missing permission check vulnerability.
4 Technical Challenges and Our Solutions
Take all the factors into account, out goal is to design and
implement a symbolic execution based static analysis system
to detect vulnerabilities for EOSIO smart contracts. To recover
more semantic information, we use heuristic-based symbolic
execution to perform in-depth analysis. Namely, semantic
information will be presented in the constraints generated
by symbolic execution along the paths being analyzed. As
a result, we are able to use those constraints as patterns to
identify vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
Comparing with Ethereum Smart Contract Analysis.
Although there exist a number of static analysis tools pro-
posed for Ethereum smart contracts, it is worth noting that
they cannot be applied directly (or even after minor changes)
to EOSIO smart contracts due to the differences between the
two platforms, including VM models (e.g., allowing global
variables), instructions (e.g., supporting floating-point opera-
tions) and system-level data structures (e.g., using multi-index
table to store persistent data). In brief, these functionalities
provided by EOSIO inevitably affect the design/implementa-
tion of the proposed system. For instance, we have to consider
the side effect caused by the use of external/system libraries
(see §4.3 for details). Apart from these differences, the vulner-
abilities of EOSIO smart contracts are totally different from
those of Ethereum smart contracts, which acquire different
kinds of context information to support the detection. For
example, the rollback vulnerability requires multiple actions
being included in one transaction. As such, the detection re-
lies on the propagation of some specific chain state variables
(discussed in §5.3.3).
As a result, no available symbolic analysis framework
could be used to handle the EOSIO Wasm bytecode. Specif-
ically, we have to overcome several technical challenges to
realize the proposed system. On one hand, it is known that
symbolic execution based solutions may suffer from inherent
shortcomings, path explosion in particular. On the other hand,
when applied to vulnerability detection for EOSIO smart con-
tracts, there do exist platform-specific issues, including mem-
ory overlap and external/system library dependency, which
will inevitably affect the effectiveness of symbolic execution.

Address      A         A+2   A+3   A+4
load  (A,A+4)
w
Address      A    A+1        A+3   A+4
store  (A+1,A+3)
... ...
... ... x
Address      A    A+1   A+2  A+3   A+4
load  (A+1,A+3)
... ...
v
Address      A         A+2         A+4
load  (A,A+4)
... ...
Figure 4: The memory overlap problem.
4.1 Path Explosion
In EOSIO, this issue is mainly due to two circumstances:
executing conditional jump instructions (such as br_if) or in-
voking function call. Specifically, unlike a normal conditional
jump instruction that only generates two new branches, br_-
table in EOSIO, however, takes an array whose elements are
pointers of destination as the argument. As a result, a single
br_table can lead to n new branches, where n is the length
of the array. Apart from those conditional jump instructions,
a function call also imposes many new branches to repre-
sent all possible callees. Obviously, the number of branches
will increase exponentially if there exists a deep call stack.
Unfortunately, a concatenation of several deep call stacks is
common in EOSIO contracts. As such, there is a practical
need to mitigate this issue, otherwise the symbolic execution
solution will not be applicable.
To this end, we adopt a heuristic-guided pruning ap-
proach to solve the challenge. On one side, we rely on several
general pruning strategies based on our hands-on experience
to mitigate the issue derived from branches and deep function
calls. For example, our operational observation suggests that
discarding paths under a specific depth threshold, which is
determined by the scenario, will not influence the precision
of results for (almost) all cases. Specifically, we expose 1)
an option named call depth, which limits the depth of call
stack; and 2) an option named timeout for users to limit the
process of symbolic execution.
However, the effectiveness of the general mitigation strate-
gies are limited in practice. Fortunately, this issue in EOSIO
can be further (partially) resolved when performing vulner-
ability detection, as we only have to pay attention to some
specific features/structures of the vulnerable code snippet. For
example, when detecting fake EOS and fake receipt vulner-
abilities, only apply and transfer functions are taken into
consideration. All these technical details and vulnerability-
specific pruning strategies will be discussed in §5.3.
4.2 Memory Overlap
The memory area of Wasm can be regarded as a vector of un-
interpreted bytes [21], which means users can interpret these
raw bits through load and store with different value types.
The traditional way to emulate memory is to use linear array,
but it is memory-consuming, due to mimicking the sparse
memory layout of the EOSIO smart contract. Therefore, we
decide to use key-value mappings to emulate the memory,
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where the key is a tuple to specify the address range, and the
value is the data being stored, as follows:
(lower-bound,upper-bound) 7→ data
However, this strategy may lead to the memory overlap
(see Fig. 4). If we use the mapping without optimization, keys
(A+ 2,A+ 3), (A+ 3,A+ 4), and (A+ 2,A+ 4) can all be
stored directly with no conflicts. As a result, if we retrieve
data with the key (A,A+4), there exists two cases meeting
the condition (Case 1 and 2 shown in Fig. 4), which may result
in retrieving the wrong data. Additionally, in Case 3, if we
want to update data in (A+1,A+3), we have to traverse the
key space to determine if there is only one entity containing
the address range we provided, which must be guaranteed to
ensure data consistency. In Case 4, we have to concatenate
adjacent stored data chunks to determine how to load data in
the memory area. In nutshell, all these problems are due to
the overlapping memory and improper mapping strategy.
We propose a memory-merging method (see §5.1.2) to
solve the problem by merging allocated memory. As afore-
mentioned, Wasm provides over 20 memory access related
instructions. We will first create key-value mappings for all
of the store-related instructions we encountered, where the
values are the stored data in bits. After that, we are able to
handle the cases when the ranges of two keys are adjacent or
overlapped according to the proposed memory-merging algo-
rithm, which will update the corresponding data chunks to
guarantee the precision of execution. In brief, we make every
effort to guarantee that the interval between any two arbitrary
keys is at least one bit. By doing so, we can successfully
overcome the challenge raised in Fig. 4.
4.3 Library Dependency
To facilitate the development of smart contracts, EOSIO al-
lows the import of external functions as libraries, which means
the bodies of these imported functions will not be compiled
into Wasm bytecode. EOSIO officially provides plenty of
such functions as the system library for DApp developers.
They have been widely used in many (if not most) smart con-
tracts. As a result, our analysis will be improperly terminated
due to the lack of bodies of those imported function calls.
To resolve the dependency, we have proposed an on-
demand and semantic-aware approach (see §5.2) to em-
ulate the imported functions. We only focus on functions
whose functionality and side effect are related to our analysis.
We have to emulate such functions properly to guarantee the
correctness of the final result. The strength and coverage of
the emulation depend on our need to perform the analysis. For
some functions, we have to cover the arguments, return value
and side effect. For instance, the memory-related function,
memmov, in which we have to consider all its side effect on
the symbolic memory. For some others, we may only need
to consider the possible side effect. For example, for those
Memory-merging algorithm
overlapped
(a) Wasm Symbolic Execution Engine
(c) Vulnerability Scanner
(b) EOSIO Library Emulator
State
Symbolic 
memory
Global
Function 
stackCurrent function
• Local 
• Stack
• Program counter 
• Instructions
internal call . . . share
State 
stack
. . .
(c.1) LocateFuns
target functions
…
(c.2) ExecDetectorInput
query
query
CFG
Dissembled 
Wasm 
Instructions
Path 
Tree
Vulnerability 
Report
call 
imported 
function
• Fake EOS 
• Fake Receipt 
• Missing Permission Check 
• Rollback
• blockchain-state 
• authority-related
• memory-related 
• table-related
• control-flow-related
Figure 5: The architecture of EOSAFE.
table-related functions which has no return value and no effect
on vulnerability detection, e.g., db_store_i64, we can just
balance the stack without mimicking its behaviors.
5 System Design
Fig. 5 depicts the overall architecture of EOSAFE, which
takes the Wasm bytecode of an EOSIO smart contract as
the input and eventually determines whether the bytecode is
vulnerable. Specifically, EOSAFE is based on Octopus [22], a
security analysis framework for Wasm modules, to launch the
preprocessing. Each smart contract will be sent to Octopus for
building its corresponding Control Flow Graph (CFG) with
the disassembled Wasm instructions.
EOSAFE is mainly composed of three modules, i.e., Wasm
Symbolic Execution Engine (Engine for short), EOSIO Li-
brary Emulator (Emulator for short), and Vulnerability Scan-
ner (Scanner for short). As shown in Fig. 5, the input after
preprocessing (CFGs) is fed to the Scanner to perform vulner-
ability detection in a two-step process (locating suspicious
functions and detecting vulnerabilities) with the Engine and
Emulator. Specifically, the Engine performs symbolic exe-
cution accordingly along with path constraints, which will
be used by the Scanner to perform vulnerability detection.
Additionally, the Engine requests Emulator to implement the
modeled behaviors when the Engine encounters the call for
imported functions. Notice that the challenges discussed in
§4.1 and §4.2 are addressed in §5.1 and §5.3, while the chal-
lenge discussed in §4.3 is addressed in §5.2.
5.1 Wasm Symbolic Execution Engine
The engine is designed as a generic framework to simulate the
execution of a smart contract on the stack-based EOS VM. It
accepts the CFGs and the disassembled Wasm instructions as
the input, and symbolically executes instructions within basic
blocks in order for all feasible paths. During the process, the
path constraints are generated accordingly. Specifically, the
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module has to maintain two crucial components: path tree
and state. For the path tree, we not only record the constraints
generated by symbolic execution, but also all the arguments
and return value of imported functions along the path, which
contribute to the analysis of vulnerability detection. As to
the state, we maintain some necessary state-related informa-
tion, including local/global variables, linear memory, stack,
and the subsequent instructions with its corresponding pro-
gram counter. Specifically, we have addressed the technical
challenges mentioned in §4.1 and §4.2 as follows.
5.1.1 Alleviating path explosion with general strategies
We provide two options, including call depth and time-
out, for users to mitigate this issue by sacrificing the accuracy.
On one hand, as the name suggests, the option call depth
is used to confine the depth of the call stack to prevent the
analysis from getting into trouble to deal with complicated
branches or deep function calls. As we know, a single func-
tion could have several sets of constraints corresponding to
feasible paths within the function, which may lead to an expo-
nential growth of the number of paths. Thus we limit the depth
of call stack to improve the coverage. On the other hand, we
may still be in trouble when encountering some cases that are
extremely time-consuming. To guarantee the progress for the
whole system, the Engine offers another option named time-
out to control the maximum execution time for the path-level
analysis. Of course, the timeout results will be recorded for
further investigation. Note that, the path explosion issue will
be further addressed in the vulnerability scanner (see § 5.3),
as we only have to pay attention to some specific features of
the vulnerable code snippets.
5.1.2 Eliminating the memory overlap
We implement a symbolic memory to represent the memory
of Wasm, and also propose a memory-merging algorithm (see
Algorithm 1) to emulate the store instruction. This algo-
rithm takes the symbolic memory, address, length of data in
byte and data as the input, and finally returns a merged sym-
bolic memory without overlapped/adjacent keys as the output.
Specifically, given a new key that will be stored, we will check
whether the address range of an existing key is overlapped
with that of the new key or not. If so, the insertion will be
performed directly; otherwise it will update the overlapped
part accordingly and concatenate the non-overlapped parts.
Furthermore, the keys are sorted in ascending order of the
starting position. If two adjacent keys are not overlapped, they
will be merged together to form a new key-value pair. For
example, the existing key-value pairs are:
symbolic memory := {(0,2) 7→ a0|a1,(3,4) 7→ a3}
Algorithm 1 Memory-merging algorithm.
Input: sm - symbolic memory, dest - insert position, len -
data length, data - data
Output: sm - updated symbolic memory
Description: es and ee respectively stand for lower-bound
and upper-bound of address range of the picked key. The o in
os and oe stands for the overlapped.
1: procedure MEMORYMERGE(sm,dest, len,data)
2: isOverlapped,es,ee← IsOverlapped(sm,dest, len)
3: if ¬isOverlapped then
4: data← ToLittleEndian(data, len)
5: sm[(dest,dest+ len)]← data
6: else
7: os,oe← CalcOverlap(es,ee,dest, len)
8: UpdateOverlappedPart(sm,os,oe,es,ee)
9: CatOtherParts(sm,os,oe,es,ee)
10: keys← SortKeys(sm)
11: while i+1 < len(keys) do
12: currentKey← keys[i]
13: nextKey← keys[i+1]
14: if currentKey[1] == nextKey[0] then
15: Merge(sm,currentKey,nextKey)
16: RemoveKeys(sm,currentKey,nextKey)
17: InsertNewKey(sm,currentKey,nextKey)
18: else
19: i← i+1
20: return sm
When (2,4) 7→ a2|a′3 arrives, it will update the overlapped
part and concatenate the non-overlapped part on necessary:
symbolic memory := {(0,2) 7→ a0|a1,(2,4) 7→ a2|a′3}
After that, it will merge the adjacent keys together:
symbolic memory := {(0,4) 7→ a0|a1|a2|a′3}
In brief, this algorithm guarantees the data consistency by
forcing all valid addresses appear only once in the key space.
Thus, we can solve all the issues raised in Fig. 4 effectively.
5.2 EOSIO Library Emulator
We use the on-demand and semantic-aware approach to re-
solve EOSIO library dependency. We have manually analyzed
the smart contracts of the top 100 popular DApps and exist-
ing known vulnerable smart contracts (see §7.1) to extract
all the imported functions from their Function section (see
§2.3). Then, we classify all the imported functions into five
categories according to their main functionalities (as shown
in Table 1) to conduct the emulation. Lastly, we can retrieve
the side effects from the emulated imported functions.
Specifically, the emulated imported functions are classified
into categories, as shown in Table 1. The corresponding side
effects are summarized in the following.
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Table 1: The categories of emulated imported functions.
Category Imported Function Examples
blockchain-state tapos_block_numcurrent_time
memory-related memcpymemmov
control-flow-related eosio_exiteosio_assert
authority-related require_authrequire_auth_2
table-related db_get_i64db_update_i64
Blockchain-state functions. These functions return con-
stants related to the blockchain system, which are mostly used
by the smart contracts as the seeds, to generate the pseudo-
random numbers. As they do not introduce any side effect,
we just emulate them by directly returning a symbolic value
to represent the blockchain state.
Memory-related functions. As the name suggests, func-
tions in this category are related to the symbolic memory
we have implemented. Therefore, we imitate the behaviors
as their original intention, and apply the memory-merging
algorithm when inserting the new data. Note that, we throw
an exception for undefined behaviors, e.g., the negative length
of the memcpy function due to the constraint solving.
Control flow related functions. These functions are those
which may alter or terminate the control flow of a smart con-
tract according to their return results. Therefore, we will fork
two paths if necessary. For example, two paths will be gen-
erated if the predicate of the eosio_assert function is a
symbolic value rather than a specific boolean value.
Authority-related functions. As the authority system is
merely related to the detection of missing permission check
vulnerability, we only have to examine the existence of these
functions without concerning about the specific permission.
Hence, we just return a symbolic value to balance the stack.
Table-related functions. There is a special data structure
in EOSIO that allows for persistent storage of data. Similar to
the concept of storage in Ethereum, this kind of data is saved
on the blockchain that is called table. Table can be regarded
as a database that supports CRUD operations (i.e., Create,
Retrieve, Update and Delete) by several platform-specific
instructions. For these functions, we only have to focus on the
side effects to the memory rather than the internal operations.
Specifically, we have implemented them with return values
used to update the memory, as follows:
A = db_get_i64(itr,data, length)
i64.store(base,A)
Note that for functions (e.g., db_update_i64) that do not
have any return value but modify the contents of the table, we
record their function names and arguments in the constraints.
5.3 Vulnerability Scanner
To detect multiple vulnerabilities, the Scanner is designed
as a generic framework to perform the detection. It mainly
consists of two steps, i.e., locating suspicious functions and
detecting vulnerabilities. Accordingly, our goal is to realize
detectors for the four vulnerabilities introduced in §3.
The general strategies proposed in §5.1.1 can alleviate the
path explosion problem to some extent, however, it is still not
enough to meet our needs. Fortunately, one key insight can
help further mitigate this issue, i.e., we only have to focus
on valuable functions that call external functions with the
ability to change the on-chain state, including send_inline
(see §2.2), db_update_i64 and db_store_i64 (see §5.2).
According to our observation, these valuable functions can
be heuristically regarded as target functions in most cases,
which can significantly reduce the analyzing time. As a result,
in favor of CFG and path tree (composed of constraints and
valuable functions), we can identify vulnerabilities efficiently
and accurately. Specifically, we define the following formulas:
{send_inline( f unc)} ⊆ conX (1)
{db_update_i64(args, ...)} ⊆ conX (2)
{db_store_i64(args, ...)} ⊆ conX (3)
Here conX represents the constraints of a given function,
where X is the name of the function being analyzed. X is
said to be a valuable function if and only if conX satisfies at
least one of the three criterion.
As a result, the two steps of the detection framework can
be further transferred and simplified as a valuable-function-
centric process: 1) locating valuable functions; and 2) verify-
ing their reachability to launch attacks. Note that the second
step of the process is optional since the reachability can al-
ways be guaranteed in some cases. Based on this framework,
we will introduce the details for the four detectors.
5.3.1 Fake EOS Detection
As discussed in §3.1 and depicted in Fig. 3, the fake EOS
vulnerability can only be triggered by invoking the transfer
function, which becomes the valuable function that can lead
to financial losses, which satisfies the following condition:
{send_inline(. . .)} ⊆ contrans f er
Moreover, the transfer function must be reachable from
the entry (i.e., the apply function) by attackers, which means
there does not exist proper verification of code in the apply
function. Specifically, the detector traverses all the feasible
paths generated by symbolically executing the apply function
to examine if the constraints of the current path correspond
with the following condition:
{action← transfer} ∩ ({code← self} ∪
{∀acct ∈ accounts,code 6← acct})⊆ conapply
Specifically, it restricts that only the paths associated with
the transfer function can be analyzed. To accelerate the
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analysis, the Engine will terminate irrelevant paths (if the
destination is not transfer) in advance to avoid further ex-
ecution. Then, the detector will examine the value in code,
as discussed in §3.1. Thus, the satisfaction of any of the con-
ditions associated with the code implies the existence of im-
proper verification. In summary, a smart contract that meets
the above conditions is considered to be vulnerable.
5.3.2 Fake Receipt Detection
This vulnerability is due to inadequate verification inside
the transfer function. However, the corresponding send_-
inline function is extremely deep, which always leads to
call depth overflow to break the Engine. Therefore, it is not
feasible to locate the valuable function (i.e., the transfer
function) from the entry (i.e., the apply function) through
symbolic execution directly.
To solve the problem, we adopt a heuristic-based method
instead. Specifically, the detector first identifies the apply
function, and then enumerates all the relevant basic blocks
to verify their jump targets whose indices may point to the
suspicious transfer functions.
After locating the suspicious transfer functions, the de-
tector relies on criteria from 1 to 3 to determine the valuable
transfer function. Note that for a given smart contract, there
shall exist exactly one transfer function (like Fig. 3), which
implies that the transfer function is either one of the suspi-
cious functions, or inlined in the apply function, as follows:
∃sus ∈ setsuspicious,{action← transfer} ⊆ consus
or:
∀sus ∈ setsuspicious,{action← transfer} 6⊆ consus
For either of the above two cases, we would further examine
the existence of the following protection:
f unc ∈ {sus,apply},{to← sel f} ⊆ con f unc
A smart contract that meets the above conditions is regarded
to be vulnerable to the fake receipt vulnerability.
Besides, this detector also applies early termination to
accelerate the whole process. Specifically, for the valuable
transfer, the protection should be verified before updating
changes for related on-chain states. Thus, it is reasonable to
terminate the analysis when encountering any of the three
criteria without protection along the path.
5.3.3 Rollback Detection
As shown in Fig. 3, the reveal function often generates ran-
dom number to determine the jackpot winner, and invokes
the transfer function in eosio.token by an inlined action
to return the prize. Thus, the reveal function becomes the
valuable function according to Criterion 1. In some circum-
stances, however, computational burden has to be considered
when handling the reveal function, i.e., the call depth of the
send_inline function is too deep for the Engine to reach.
Fortunately, as it is not necessary to consider the reacha-
bility of the send_inline function in a path for any target
gambling DApp (see §3.3), we are able to apply two strate-
gies to accelerate the process to locate the reveal function.
Specifically, the first strategy is to traverse feasible paths on
demand. Instead of enumerating all paths, we only examine
paths that can be used to resolve the data/variable dependency
of the target send_inline function. On the other hand, the
second strategy reduces the size of the path set being exam-
ined by the Engine after extracting valuable functions, namely,
removing redundant paths whose basic blocks are thoroughly
the subset of other paths. Consequently, we can achieve the
smallest path set to cover as many basic blocks as possible.
Finally, the detection logic is associated with two properties.
Firstly, our investigation suggests that the reveal function
will generate random numbers with the rem instruction along
the path inside the constructed path set. Secondly, as explained
in §3.3, if the operands of the modulo calculation are (par-
tially) generated by blockchain-state functions (see §5.2), the
smart contract will be affected by the rollback vulnerability.
In summary, the detection logic must satisfy:
{rem(operand1,operand2)} ⊆ conreveal ∩
operand1 ∈ BlockChainStateFuncs
Here operand2 is always a constant or a variable that has
nothing to do with the blockchain state. If the above condi-
tions are met, we can confirm this contract is vulnerable to
the rollback vulnerability. Note that we will remove all the
rem instructions generated by EOSIO official libraries, e.g.,
eoslib, to reduce false positives.
5.3.4 Missing Permission Check Detection
As discussed in §3.4, we focus on those functions that are
valuable and lacking of authority validation before the sen-
sitive operations. Again, such functions should be reachable
through the apply function. After filtering all the valuable
functions according to criteria from 1 to 3, we would examine
if the constraints comply with the following conditions:
({∀ f unc ∈ set f unc,action← f unc} ∩
{code← self})⊆ conapply ∩
({require_auth(acct)} 6⊆ con f unc)
Specifically, the first condition firstly requires that the func-
tion (identified by f unc) is reachable by an attacker through
the apply function. Then, the second condition implies that
the f unc is allowed to be triggered directly. Lastly, the third
condition checks if the f unc lacks of authority verification. If
the above conditions are met, the smart contract is vulnerable
to the missing permission check vulnerability.
6 Implementation and Experimental Setup
Implementation We take advantage of Octopus to construct
the CFG of Wasm bytecode, and use the Z3 Theorem Prover
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(version 4.8.6) as our constraint solver. All the other major
components, including Wasm Symbolic Execution Engine,
Library Emulator and Vulnerability Scanners are all designed
and implemented by ourselves. The implementation is based
in Python, which includes over 5.5k lines of code.
Experimental Setup Our experiment is performed on a
server running Debian with four Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2620
v4 @ 2.10GHz and 64G RAM. As mentioned in §5, the Wasm
engine has provided two configuration options (i.e., call depth,
and timeout) to partially address the path explosion issue. Dur-
ing our experiments, we empirically set the call depth as 2
layers, as we find it is enough to identify most vulnerabilities.
As to the exploration time, we empirically set the upper bound
as 5 minutes, due to the following two main reasons. First,
within 5 minutes, all the smart contracts in our benchmark
can be fully analyzed and detected with promising results
(see §7.1). Second, as we seek to apply EOSAFE to all the
EOSIO smart contracts, we have to make a trade-off between
accuracy and scalability. Therefore, the exploration time for
each contract is set at a maximum of 5 minutes. Note that, all
these settings could be easily configured and customized in
our tool, to fulfill the different requirements.
Research Questions. Our evaluation is driven by the follow-
ing three research questions (RQs).
RQ1 How accurate is EOSAFE in detecting vulnerabilities of
EOSIO smart contracts?
RQ2 Are these vulnerabilities prevalent in the ecosystem?
RQ3 How many smart contracts have been exploited by at-
tackers and what are the impacts of these attacks?
To answer RQ1, in the absence of established benchmarks
in the research community, we propose to collect real-world
attacks and manually examine the victim smart contracts to
craft a reliable benchmark. To answer RQ2, we collect all
the available smart contracts on EOSIO and their historical
versions. Then we apply EOSAFE to detect the presence
of security vulnerabilities, and characterize the evolution of
vulnerabilities. To answer RQ3, we further collect all the on-
chain transactions related to the flagged vulnerable contracts,
and then propose heuristics to pinpoint possible attacks.
7 Experimental Results
7.1 RQ1: Accuracy of Vulnerability Detection
Benchmark. To evaluate EOSAFE, we first make efforts
to craft a benchmark, which will be made available to the
community. EOSIO attacks were reported from time to time.
Thus, we resort to the security reports released by well-known
blockchain security companies to collect all the related pub-
licly verified attacks [23, 24] as the ground-truth. We have
collected 38 attacks, targeting 34 unique vulnerable smart con-
tracts in total. Although these attacks were confirmed by the
official team of the corresponding DApps, we found that some
attacks are irrelevant to smart contract itself but other external
Table 2: Evaluation on the benchmark.
Vulnerability # Samples(Vul/Safe) Precision Recall F1-measure
Fake EOS 14 (7/7) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Fake Receipt 10 (5/5) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Rollback 18 (9/9) 100.00% 88.89% 94.12%
Permission 10 (6/4)* 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Total 52 (27/25) 100.00% 96.97% 98.46%
* 4 pairs of the missing permission check samples are manually crafted.
factors, e.g., the server’s issues [25]. Thus, we further manu-
ally examined all the involved smart contracts. Specifically,
we found that 3 out of the 10 fake EOS attacks are related to
server issues (e.g., [25]). For rollback, 11 out of 21 attacks
are due to the wrong reveal strategy of the server (e.g., [26]).
Besides, 2 of them were variants of rollback, which are re-
lated to the configuration of some nodes on EOS MainNet
(see [27]). At last, we excluded all the above contracts from
our benchmark to make sure all the attacks are resulted from
the code in the smart contract itself.
The distribution of the benchmark is shown in Table 2.
Note that we also collected the corresponding patched smart
contracts (without vulnerabilities) as comparison to evaluate
the effectiveness of EOSAFE. Additionally, there are only two
vulnerable smart contracts related to the missing permission
check vulnerability as reported and neither of them has been
patched yet. Thus, we further manually created 4 pairs of
smart contracts (with and without missing permission check
vulnerability) to complement our benchmark. At last, we have
labelled 52 smart contracts as our benchmark in total.
Results. Among the 52 smart contracts, EOSAFE flags 26
as vulnerable, with only one false negative case (belongs to
rollback) and no false positives, leading to precision and recall
of 100% and 96.97%, respectively. Table 2 shows the detailed
results. For the only false negative case of rollback, i.e., fair-
dogegame/betdogewallt, the root cause is the number of
suspicious reveal is too many to build path and symbolically
execute each of them for a given timeout (5 minutes here).
After manually locating the vulnerable function, i.e., func73,
we can get a correct result. Therefore, the false negative is
introduced by the optimization strategies, which is a trade-
off between accuracy and scalability. It is easy to tune our
approach to cover it, e.g., by exploring more paths and increas-
ing the analyzing time. Nevertheless, the exceptional case is
rarely seen during experiments, as most smart contracts are
not too complicated to handle.
7.2 RQ2: Prevalence of Vulnerabilities
Dataset. We consider all the 53,666 smart contracts (includ-
ing history versions) from June 9, 2018 (the very beginning
of EOS MainNet) to November 15, 2019. Note that, differ-
ent from Ethereum smart contracts that cannot be modified
once deployed, EOSIO contracts could be updated and bind
with the same account as explained in §2.1. Thus, we use the
EOSIO account to label each unique smart contract, i.e., one
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Table 3: Vulnerability detection results in the wild.
Type # Contracts # Vulnerable (%) # Unique # Vulnerable (%)
Fake EOS 53,666 1,457 (2.71%) 5,574 272 (4.88%)
Fake Receipt 53,666 7,143 (13.31%) 5,574 2,192 (39.33%)
Rollback 17,394 1,149 (6.61%) 913 84 (9.20%)
Permission 53,666 8,373 (15.60%) 5,574 662 (11.88%)
Total 53,666 13,752 (25.63%) 5,574 2,759 (49.50%)
account may correspond to multiple contract versions. As a
result, we have 53,666 different versions of contracts, which
belong to 5,574 EOSIO accounts. As the rollback vulnerabil-
ity is only related to the gambling DApps, we can shrink our
candidate list here. We refer to DAppTotal [28] – a credible
multi-platform DApp browser, to label the gambling DApps
and use such contracts (17,394) for rollback vulnerability de-
tection. For the other three kinds of vulnerabilities, we apply
our detectors to all the 53,666 contracts (see Table 3).
7.2.1 Overall Results
Table 3 shows the overall results. Surprisingly, over 25% of
the 53,666 smart contracts are vulnerable (see Column 3). The
missing permission check vulnerability is the most prevalent,
affecting over 15% of the smart contracts. The fake receipt
vulnerability is also quite common (13%). For the rollback
vulnerability, although we only analyzed 17K smart contracts
of gambling DApps, over 1,000 of them are vulnerable. The
fake EOS vulnerability affects roughly 2.7% of the smart con-
tracts. It suggests that security vulnerabilities are prevalent in
the EOSIO smart contract ecosystem, revealing the urgency
to identify and prevent such vulnerabilities.
Vulnerable Unique Smart Contracts. As one smart con-
tract may correspond to multiple versions, we further charac-
terize the distribution of vulnerabilities from the perspective
of unique contracts (accounts). As shown in Column 5 of
Table 3, for the 5,574 unique contracts, roughly half of them
have at least one vulnerable version. 10% of unique smart
contracts account for 61.24% of vulnerable versions, which
indicates most of vulnerable versions are imported by a small
portion of smart contracts. Besides, there are 1,793 unique
smart contracts, whose versions are all vulnerable (41% of
them have at least two versions). The contract eossanguoone,
which is a popular game DApp, has the most number of vul-
nerable versions (356 versions). By manual inspection, we
found that all its versions released before September 4, 2019
have suffered from the fake receipt vulnerability, and then
the vulnerability was patched by the developer. The missing
permission check vulnerability has been found since August
2019, which may be due to the importing of the new functions
without authority check.
7.2.2 Time to fix the vulnerability
As we have analyzed the evolution of vulnerabilities across
different versions, it is thus necessary to further investigate the
time to fix the vulnerabilities for each unique smart contract,
Table 4: The time to fix the vulnerabilities.
Type # Unique (Vul) # Latest with Vul (%) # Patched (%) Patch Time
Fake EOS 272 207 (76.10%) 65 (23.90%) 14.85d
Fake Receipt 2,192 1,735 (79.15%) 457 (20.85%) 24.01d
Rollback 84 28 (33.33%) 56 (66.67%) 4.24d
Permission 662 313 (47.28%) 349 (53.72%) 4.38d*
Total 2,759 2,080 (75.39%) 679 (24.61%) 16.84d
*The average patch time for missing permission check is calculated on the action level.
which could be used to measure the window period for the
attackers to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Result. As shown in Table 4, for the 2,759 unique smart
contracts with vulnerable versions, over 75% of them still
have at least one security vulnerability in their latest version
by the time of our study. 679 unique smart contracts have
patched all their vulnerabilities during their evolution, and the
average window period is 16.84 days.
Patch Rate. We further analyze the patch rate across vul-
nerabilities. The rollback vulnerability has the highest patch
rate (over 66%), and the average window period is roughly
4 days. The reason for its timely response might be that the
rollback vulnerability only exists in game/gambling DApps,
which usually have high balance in their accounts. The finan-
cial loss could be devastating if developers leave the vulner-
ability alone. For the missing permission check, 349 smart
contracts have patched all their missing check actions. Note
that, we measured the average patch time on the action level
here, as one vulnerable contract may have more than one miss-
ing permission check actions. There are 647 patched actions
in total – roughly 500 of them are patched within only one
day, while the overall patch time is 4.38 days. It suggests that
most of the missing permission checking actions are patched
timely, while a few contracts take relative long time to fix.
In contrast, the fake EOS and the fake receipt vulnerabilities
have the lowest patch rates (i.e., roughly 20%), and the patch-
ing time is relative long (i.e., 2 to 3 weeks on average). Our
manual check found that, half of the smart contracts related
to fake receipt are patched within 24 hours, which further
indicates that some inactive smart contracts drag the average
patch time. Most of the inactive smart contracts (accounts)
have no balance and very few transactions, which are usually
not the targets of attackers.
7.3 RQ3: The Presence of Attacks
7.3.1 Approach
It is not trivial to explore how many of the vulnerable smart
contracts have been successfully exploited by the attackers.
Until recently, a lot of ad hoc (often manual) efforts of security
researchers [23, 24] are necessary to verify them. Thus, given
the vulnerable smart contracts, we first collect all their related
on-chain transactions, and then design a set of heuristics to
locate the suspicious attacks, which will be used to facilitate
further manual verification to determine the real attacks. In
total, we have collected over 2.5billion transaction records.
Fake EOS Attack. The most important behavior of this
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attack is to defraud the official EOS tokens from the vulnera-
ble smart contract by using the fake EOS tokens, which can
be identified through the transaction records storing the in-
formation of token issuers. According to the observation, we
will first filter out all the transactions of token transfer whose
token symbols are “EOS”. Then, these transactions will be
grouped according to the following definitions:
• fake-sending transactions that send fake EOS tokens.
• true-sending transactions that send true EOS tokens.
• true-receiving transactions that receive true EOS tokens.
As a result, we can define a potential attack as a sequence
of a fake-sending transaction followed by a true-receiving
transaction. Note that a fake-sending transaction A can be
joined with a true-receiving transaction B, if and only if they
appear on the same period while A occurs before B. For
all these potential transactions, we focus mainly on those
who have gained more true EOS tokens than they spent. To
this end, we further examine the input-output ratio between
the attacker and the vulnerable contracts to determine the
suspicious attacks. Finally, based on the suspicious attacks,
we will verify whether the vulnerable smart contracts will
resume the normal execution (e.g., running a lottery for a real
player) after receiving the fake EOS tokens. If so, we will
mark the suspicious transaction as a fake EOS attack.
Fake Receipt Attack. The key feature of this attack is that
the vulnerable smart contract is misled by the fake notifica-
tion to receive tokens, while the actual token transfer occurs
between the two accounts belonging to the same attacker (see
§3.2). For simplicity, we will use from_account and to_ac-
count to represent the two accounts in the following, where
to_account will send the fake receipt to vulnerable contract,
and from_account is the ultimate beneficiary.
Accordingly, we will first query all the transactions of token
transfer whose tokens are issued by eosio.token and token
symbols are “EOS”, to get all the true EOS token transfers.
Then, we will filter out the transactions whose receivers are
neither eosio.token, nor the from_account or to_account.
These transactions will be regarded as the fake receipts with
crafted notifications. Next, if a from_account sends a fake
receipt before making profits from the vulnerable contract,
we will mark the corresponding transaction as potential. After
that, by eliminating the unrelated EOS spending transactions
(e.g., for testing purpose initiated by the attacker), we focus
mainly on those who have gained more true EOS tokens
than they spent. If the input-output ratio are still high, the
corresponding transactions are labeled as suspicious.
Finally, we will manually check the suspicious transactions
whether the vulnerable smart contract will resume the normal
execution after receiving the fake receipts. If so, we will mark
such a transaction as a fake receipt attack.
Rollback Attack. As mentioned in §3.3, the transaction of
this attack is composed of sequential invocations of actions,
which can be used as the pattern to identify the attack.
Table 5: Overall results of attack detection.
Type # Attacks
# Attacker
/ Victims Financial Loss ($) # Verified
Fake EOS 9 10 / 9 652,428.48 8
Fake Receipt 27 28 / 17 1,020,831.94 7
Rollback 12 12 / 9 52,984.00 12
Permission 183 - / 144 - -
Total 48* 50 / 34* 1,726,244.42 27
* Exclude the results of missing permission check.
Table 6: Top 5 identified attack events.
Attack Type Attacker Account(s) Victim Account EOS Loss Amount Loss ($)
Fake Receipt il***23, wh***r1 eosbetdice11 138,319.80 756,609.30
Fake EOS re***et eoscastdmgb1 63,014.10 327,673.32
Fake Receipt re***om, re***et nkpaymentcap 53,641.71 200,619.98
Fake EOS aa***fg eosbetdice11 44,427.43 234,132.56
Fake Receipt be***s1, be***s2 epsdcclassic 17,388.73 41,559.07
Total - - 341,437.30 1,638,803.89
Specifically, we will first filter out all the transactions who
contains at least four actions as the potential transactions.
Next, we will select suspicious transactions which as long as
meet the following four conditions: (1) the first and the last
actions must be invoked in the same contract, where the first
means to start the attack, and the last will determine whether
the rollback is necessary after receiving the reward from the
vulnerable smart contract. (2) the two actions in the middle
must be token transfers through eosio.token, and the sender
and the receiver (either one must be the vulnerable smart con-
tract) of the two actions are arranged opposite to each other.
(3) at least one of the counterparties, i.e., either the sender or
the receiver, is labeled as the gambling or game DApp. (4) the
amount of tokens transferred from the vulnerable smart con-
tract is more than it received. Besides, it is worth noting that,
the rollbacked transactions will not be recorded on the chain.
As a result, we have to manually check the player’s successful
rate per unit time, namely, if it is oddly high than the others,
we will mark the suspicious transaction as a rollback attack.
Missing Permission Check Attack. Because authority in-
formation is along with the invoked transaction, we can ex-
amine whether it belongs to the callee contract to identify this
attack. More precisely, we will first screen out all the transac-
tions whose target actions are the vulnerable actions, to get
suspicious transactions. Then, if the transaction’s authority
does not belong to that smart contract the action belongs to,
we will mark it as a missing permission check attack.
7.3.2 Results
The overall result is shown in Table 5. We have identified 48
attacks in total, including 9 fake EOS attacks, 27 fake receipt
attacks, and 12 rollback attacks. Additionally, we also identi-
fied 183 invoked actions (belonging to 144 contracts) which
missed the permission check (see Table 7 in Appendix). Note
that, for these missing permission check actions, some of them
are designed intentionally instead of unexpected implementa-
tion. It is hard to differentiate whether they are attacks or not,
and it is impossible to estimate the financial loss. Therefore,
we regard them as misuse actions instead of attacks.
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Impact of Attacks. The 48 identified attacks lead to over
341K EOS loss, which is roughly 1.7M USD according the
close price of the date of attacks. Note that we have collabo-
rated with a leading blockchain security company to report
these attacks to the DApp developers, and 27 of them have
been confirmed, accounting for more than 99% of the total
loss. All the unconfirmed suspicious attack events only relate
to a few EOS, and most of them are no longer active. The
Top-5 confirmed attack events are listed in the Table 6.
Unexploited Vulnerable Contracts. It is interesting to ob-
serve that, although thousands of contracts are vulnerable (see
Table 3), only a few of them have been successfully exploited
by attackers. We manually sampled some smart contracts
for reverse engineering and inspecting their transactions, we
found there are mainly two reasons leading to this. First, the
popular smart contracts (with high balance) are the main tar-
gets of attackers, but these vulnerable contracts can be patched
in time, and leave a very short window period for attackers.
Based on the transactions, we found that attackers are always
trying to exploit the popular contracts, and some attacks are
indeed succeed (see Table 6), while most of them were failed.
Second, as we mentioned in §7.2.2, most of the unpatched
smart contracts are inactive ones that have low balance, which
attract low attention of attackers, considering the trade-off
between low profit and the cost of attacks.
8 Threats to Validity
First, our system inherits the limitation of symbolic execution,
i.e., path explosion. Although we have implemented several
optimization strategies, EOSAFE still reports false negative
case, as discussed in §7.1. However, this is not a big issue for
our system. On one hand, most of the smart contracts are not
as complicate as other software. A large portion of smart con-
tracts can be fully analyzed in a short time. On the other hand,
we have proposed specific optimization methods when search-
ing for the vulnerabilities that could eliminate most irrelevant
paths. Nevertheless, we agree that we can take advantage of
advanced symbolic execution techniques [29–34] to alleviate
this issue. Second, we rely on heuristics and semi-automated
methods to verify attacks (see §7.3). This, of course, might
not be scalable and could mean that we only offer a lower-
bound of attacks. However, a large portion of the attacks we
identified are confirmed by DApp teams, which suggests that
our approach is quite reliable. Nevertheless, we agree that
some techniques (e.g., dynamic testing) can be applied to
help us automatically identify attacks. In this paper, our main
contribution is automatically detecting the security vulnera-
bilities, while attack verification is not a main focus in this
work. Third, there might be some new vulnerabilities we did
not cover in this current prototype, as well as the general vul-
nerabilities in other software systems, such as buffer overflow.
In this paper, we focus only on the EOSIO-specific vulnera-
bilities, the main reason is that we are lacking ground-truth
of other security bugs. Nevertheless, we argue that it is easy
to extend our system to cover other vulnerabilities, as the
symbolic execution engine and the scanner framework are
generic. Moreover, EOSAFE can also work on Wasm byte-
code of other platforms (e.g., web), while the only effort is to
resolve the library dependency of the corresponding platform.
9 Related Work
WebAssembly Bytecode Analysis WebAssembly is the new
low-level language for the web. There are only a handful
work on analyzing the Wasm bytecode [35–39]. For example,
Lehmann et al. [37] has proposed a general-purpose dynamic
analysis system for Wasm, which allows developers or re-
searchers to implement heavyweight dynamic analysis, e.g.,
instruction counting and memory access tracing. However, all
of them were focused on web applications, which were mainly
dynamic analysis. In this paper, we implemented a general
symbolic execution framework for Wasm, and made effort to
support the security analysis of EOSIO smart contracts.
EOSIO Analysis There are several works were focused on
the EOSIO ecosystem [40–44]. For example, Huang et al. [43]
proposed a method to identify the bot-like accounts in EOSIO
based on transaction analysis. Lee et al. [44] introduced and
studied four attacks stemming from the unique design of
EOSIO. Several technical blogs [7, 8, 25, 27, 45, 46] from
the industry have reported the security attacks of EOSIO.
However, there are no available work available on detecting
the security vulnerabilities in EOSIO.
Vulnerability Detection of Ethereum Smart Contracts
Ethereum has received lots of attention from academia, and
a number of studies were focused on the vulnerability detec-
tion [9–16, 47–50]. For example, [13, 49, 50] were mainly
focused on the overflow vulnerabilities. Luu et al. [15] pro-
posed Oyente, the first symbolic execution tool for detecting
vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts. Machine learning
and fuzz testing techniques [47,48] were also adopted to iden-
tify the vulnerabilities of Ethereum smart contracts. As we
mentioned earlier, the two ecosystems (Ethereum and EOSIO)
are totally different, and no previous work on Ethereum can be
applied to analyze EOSIO smart contracts directly. Neverthe-
less, we admit that the general idea of Ethereum vulnerability
detection can be used to improve our work.
10 Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first work
on detecting security vulnerabilities in EOSIO smart contracts.
We propose EOSAFE, an accurate and scalable framework,
which is capable of detecting EOSIO specific vulnerabilities.
Experiment results suggest the promising performance of
EOSAFE. Our large-scale measurement study further reveals
serious security issues in the ecosystem, i.e., over 25% of the
smart contracts are vulnerable and a number of high-profile
attacks have been successfully carried out.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Missing Permission Check Actions.
We have identified 183 missing permission check actions, as
shown in Table 7.
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Table 7: A List of Missing Permission Check Actions and their Corresponding Accounts.
Account Action Account Action Account Action
214odicedice leave eosknightsio rebirth3 oneplayslots clearrow
akdexiononce clear eosknightsio skcsell oyeyeyeyeyeo idex
akdexiononce nonce eosknightsio signup oyeyeyeyeyeo iban
alibabapool1 jackpot eosknightsio skillreset paritysupply adduser
aqsensordata update eosknightsio petgacha3 paritysupply newaccount
arbarotokenn create eosknightsio itemlvup3 paritysupply stake
arbarotokenn claim eosknightsio rebirth parslseed123 refund
baccarat.e reveal eoslotteryes del pcscoreprtcl refreshkey2
bairenniuniu reveal eospayserver login pcscoreprtcl refreshkey
bancor3dcode jackpot eospredictio reqpredict pickownbonus withdrawown
battlebricks startattend eosramoption trigger pickowngames withdrawref
betmoonadmin makebet eossanguoone operateboss pinganwallet m
bingobetgame playlucky eoswinnerdic initcontract pntvuxfbguce clear
bingobetgame playbonuslot eosyxtoken22 unstake pptqipae1yog m
blackjack.e resolve eosyxtoken22 getshare pythongolang update
blockfishbgp adrequest eparticlectr brainclmid rabgamecoins login
bluebetthree login eparticlectr fnlbyhash rabgamecoins logingame
bluebetthree firstlogin eparticlectr oldvotepurge rating.pra check
bosibc.io rmunablerb eparticlectr finalize resetcontrac childreflect
bosibc.io rollback eparticlectr rewardclmid romangame222 loginvestor
bosibc5chain rmfirstsctn eparticlectr procrewards roulette.e reveal
candy.w manureward exchangename accomplish sanlijishubu sign
casinolordio withdraw fairkuai3kkk close scgspzuufcce rand
conquerworld end farmeosrich1 endprofit scratchcards scratch
crheroestest battle farmeosrich1 profit scratchers55 reveal
cryptsangoku clear farmeosrichx profit signupeoscom clearexpired
daccustodia1 newperiod farmeosrichx endprofit slotcontract initstat
dappbaccarat reveal findexfindex executetrade slotmachine1 reveal
dappshieldio addsdkconfig g4ydgmjyhege deleterow stakemine123 refresh
deltadexcode preparetrade g4zdkobqhege deleterow string.x startgame
dgatepokergc reset gamblrprofit unstake superarmy123 upduser
dgatepokergc resetladder gameskypools release testblueuser updateprofit
dgatepokerpr stake godice.e reveal thebetxowner printresults
dicestaker5a verifyuser gopokerdotio verifycards thedeosgames stake
dollarbillgo check gyftietokgen generate thedepositgw mint
dsdaeveafaef claim helloworldjs out therealkarma refund
dslots123123 resolve horustokenio claimreward tothemoonmnt cbldng
dtheoschain1 deleteroom horustokenio refundbyid trustbetchat reveal
eegg.io resetcounter horustokenio refundhorus trybenetwork addtester
elpaymentcom claim ilove.q go tttblackjack dg
enserve.bank migdata jmihongbao11 recv ultrahikkash withdraw
eocfexchange ugo kdsrpgkdsrpg fabi untdevtooth1 deletesys
eosbankgamea prepare koi111111111 bid untowertest1 deletemail
eosbanksfund prepare kuai3iostake unstake usercontract buy
eosbaoserver jackpot kuai3iostake refund virtualusers checksign
eoscubetoken signup lumeospollss uppolllikes wangshaoyong setcfg
eosdaqonswap eraseconfig lumeospollss upcmntlikes warofstar.e reveal
eosdlongjohn gen lumetokenctr lock wealthplan33 fuverify
eosdtcntract positionadd lumetokenctr unlock weosservices destroytoken
eosdtorclize refreshutil lynxeosgame2 cleardb whaleexgate4 execute
eosevenstake staking lynxeosgame3 setpubkey whaleexhelpu unstake
eosevenstake claim lynxeosgame3 cleardb whaleexhelpu stake
eosfakerbatl init lynxeosgame4 cleardb wizardfights cleanwizcd
eosgamesprod pong marvellous3d reveal wizardmarket createsale
eosioshadows jackpot mhmttestcont addteainfo wizardstoken createwizard
eosjackypool claim monstereosio feedpet worldconques end
eoskeydice11 initcontract mymillionsio collect.one xiongzhend13 replacebet
eosknightsio skwear mymillionsio collect.all xmassnowball updatecamp
eosknightsio sksell nkpaybankcap updateclaim xpetiocore11 ping
eosknightsio itemlvup nkpaybankcap claim yizeshenzhen eraseconfig
eosknightsio petgacha oneplaygames clearrow yumsactivity hit
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